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DICHOTOMY IN OPEN LICENSES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
ANDRÉS GUADAMUZ-GONZÁLEZ* 
ABSTRACT 
The paper looks at the legal nature of so-called open licenses – 
agreements designed to provide permissions to users and publishers 
through “some rights reserved” clauses. The article starts with the 
assertion that copyright licenses are contracts in Civil Law 
jurisdictions, and looks at the opposing views and practice in Common 
Law jurisdictions. The article particularly looks at recent case law in 
the United States which deals specifically with the issue, and concludes 
that there is now a clear jurisdictional split between both traditions on 
whether these licenses are contracts.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The term “open license” is an umbrella denomination used to refer 
to all sorts of “some rights reserved”1 copyright agreements which 
provide users, publishers, distributors, programmers and creators rights 
that would otherwise not be available to them under the default “all 
rights reserved” copyright regime.2 These rights include permission to 
use, modify, distribute, and publish the work.3 The use of the word 
“open” in the copyright licensing arena originates from the term “open 
 *  Lecturer in E-Commerce Law, University of Edinburgh, and Co-Director of the 
SCRIPT Centre for Studies in IP and Technology Law.   
 1. See Creative Commons, What is CC?, http://creativecommons.org/about/what-is-cc 
(last visited March 06, 2009) (explaining that, the expression “some rights reserved” has 
been popularized by the Creative Commons organization). 
 2. See Christian H Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 349, 352 (Spring 2002). 
 3. Id. 
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source” (FOSS)4 which is used to describe software released through 
one of the various licenses that meet the Open Source Definition.5 
Nowadays, the term encompasses licensing solutions that extend to 
fields as diverse as software development and blogging.6 There are a 
rising number of areas that are using FOSS licensing schemes to 
distribute creative works and scientific research through novel 
publishing licensing models exemplified by the Creative Commons 
(CC) project and the Open Access (OA) movement.7 Many participants 
in diverse fields of study are looking at the open licenses used in 
software development and exporting them to accommodate the needs of 
the area where the licenses are being applied to – be it a sound 
recording, a literary work, or an academic journal article.8   
Open licenses, and in particular open source licenses, have been 
the subject of considerable scholarly legal discussion.9 However, one 
area that has generated some controversy, yet surprising little coverage, 
is that of the legal nature of the licenses. I personally became face to 
face with the debate during a paper presented at the 2007 iSummit in 
Dubrovnik, Croatia. The iSummit is an annual event that brings together 
people related to the Creative Commons, iCommons and Creative 
Commons International organizations, and the aforementioned meeting 
had the purpose of showcasing legal experts from around the world who 
are interested in the specific legal issues related to Creative Commons 
licenses – which are to be grouped in the wider definition of open 
licenses. During that presentation, one of my slides contained one small 
 4. See GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 37-39 
(2002) (resulting acronym from the two main philosophies in open non-proprietary software 
development: Free Software and Open Source Software).  
 5. Ken Coar, The Open Source Definition (Jul.7, 2006), http://www.opensource.org/d 
ocs/osd. 
 6. See Cassandra Klotz-Ingram & Kelly Day-Rubenstein, The Changing Agricultural 
Research Environment: What Does It Mean For Public-Private Innovation? 2 J. 
AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 24 (1999) (identifying the earliest reference to the 
denomination “open licenses,” to indicate the licensing of works in fields other than 
software).  
 7. See Andrés Guadamuz González, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in 
Scientific Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 330-340 (Spring 2006). 
 8. See Joseph P. Kendrick, Does Sound Travel in Cyberspace?, 8 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 39, 65 (Spring 2004); Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public 
Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 473, 474 (Spring 2003); Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging and the Transformation 
of Legal Scholarship, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2006). 
 9. See e.g., Robert Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free 
Software Movement’s Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015 (2005); Dan Ravicher, 
Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass Market 
Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J. L. & TECH. 11 (2000); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, 
or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).  
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bullet point that simply read “license or contract?” I was peripherally 
aware that this question was being asked about open source licenses, but 
I was not prepared for the heated discussion that ensued. The main issue 
that arose during the question and answer session was whether Creative 
Commons licenses are contracts or not. The question resulted in a stark 
division between legal traditions, lawyers from Civil Law countries 
opined that it was a contract, while lawyers from Common Law 
countries thought that it was not. During Q&A, Professor Lawrence 
Lessig made a clear presentation of the “licenses are not contracts” 
argument, while most Civil lawyers in the room begged to disagree, 
although finding the arguments persuasive. As a lawyer with a Civil 
Law background lecturing in a mixed legal system, I decidedly came in 
favor of the contractual solution.  
The present note is a relatively short attempt to delineate the 
arguments for and against the classification of open licenses as 
contracts. While my personal take on the subject favors the Continental 
tradition, and therefore favoring the contractual approach, I have 
attempted to look at the current situation in Common Law jurisdictions, 
which decidedly supports the separate classification. There is in my 
opinion need for a comparative analysis of this topic because of 
international nature of many of these licenses, which demands the 
broadest possible interpretation. It will be assumed that the reader is 
familiar with some of the licenses, and therefore they will not be dealt 
with in detail.10 Because the piece talks about a wide range of copyright 
licenses, there is always the danger of unwarranted generalization. 
Nevertheless, one of the starting points of the present study is that there 
are considerable similarities in the various licenses, which allow a broad 
legal study of the contractual issues surrounding them.  
II. CONTRACT OR LICENSE?  
Before understanding the controversy, it is vital that we understand 
what a license is. A license is a legal figure that grants the licensee 
permission to perform acts that they would otherwise not be able to do 
 10. See also RISHAB A. GHOSH, CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY (2005); LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT & OT VAN DAALEN, UNRAVELING THE MYTH 
AROUND OPEN SOURCE LICENSES: AN ANALYSIS FROM A DUTCH AND EUROPEAN LAW 
PERSPECTIVE (2006); Andres Guadamuz-Gonzalez, Open Science: Open Source Licenses for 
Scientific Research, 7 N.C.  J .L. & TECH. 321 (2006); Severine Dusollier, The Master’s 
Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons  v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271 
(2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Can’t Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005). 
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legally.11 When one buys commercial software, the license allows one 
to install a copy of the program in a computer, an act that would 
otherwise infringe copyright.12 As will be discussed in detail later on, in 
some jurisdictions licenses are contracts, and are classified as a specific 
type of contractual obligation.13 However, in some other countries, 
there is an uneasy relationship between licenses and contracts. An 
analogy can illustrate this dichotomy better. Imagine that you invite a 
friend to your house; this could be taken as a license to enter premises 
where they would otherwise not be entitled to do. Suppose that you give 
your friend a document with several terms and conditions, and they will 
be given permission to remain in your house as long as they comply 
with those conditions. Is this document a contract, a quasi-contract, or a 
unilateral act? This may seem like an innocuous question, but one that 
has proved to be controversial in legal circles associated to the open 
source software movement. Some Free Software proponents are 
adamant that FOSS licenses are not contracts, but copyright licenses.14 
FOSS advocate Pamela Jones explains the issue like this: 
A lot of the confusion about the GPL stems from this central 
issue: Is the GPL a license or a contract? The reason this issue 
matters is that contracts are enforced under contract law, which 
is done state by state, and there are certain necessary elements to 
qualify as a valid contract. Licenses, instead, are enforced under 
copyright law at the federal level. The penalties available are not 
the same.15 
As Jones rightly points out, this is not a mere arcane legal 
distinction, but it presents some important questions about enforcement, 
jurisdiction, applicable law, and even about license validity. There may 
also be different legal effects in some jurisdictions whether a contract is 
a contract for sale of goods, or a contract for sale of services.16  
On the other side of the debate, open source lawyer Lawrence 
Rosen believes that open licenses are unilateral contracts because they 
express a promise by the copyright owner not to interfere with actions 
 11. ANDREW M. ST. LAURENT, UNDERSTANDING OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE 
LICENSING  4 (O’Reilly 2004). 
 12. Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
275, 279 (Fall 2003). 
 13. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 14. E.g., Pamela Jones, The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, LINUX WEEKLY NEWS 
(Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.lwn.net/Articles/61292. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Hector L. MacQueen, Software Transactions and Contract Law, in LAW AND 
THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE, (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 1997) 
(distinguishing between software as sale of goods and sale of services). 
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permitted by the license.17 Furthermore, Rosen makes the strong 
argument that open contracts are better-off relying on contract law, as 
licensees would not have to rely on obscure and poorly-drafted terms 
and conditions, and instead could fall back on the richness of contract 
law.18 He states that:  
Contract law, unlike copyright and patent law, provides 
procedures and rules for license interpretation and enforcement. 
Contract law, in the published court decisions and in the statutes 
adopted by legislatures around the world, addresses almost 
every possible term or condition a lawyer could dream up for a 
contract. Contract law specifies how contracts are to be formed, 
how they are to be interpreted, how they are to be enforced, and 
the remedies for breach. In many situations, where a license is 
silent about a particular term or condition, contract law even 
provides default “fill-in” provisions.19 
The dichotomy between licenses and contracts exposed in the 
above paragraphs can be better understood in context of an ongoing 
debate about the uneasy balance that exists between contract and 
copyright law. Copyright law does not only protect the exclusive rights 
of authors, but it also protects users by explicitly allowing several acts 
that can be undertaken by members of the public without infringing 
copyright.20 These exceptions to copyright law are created by 
legislation and case law21, and one could argue that they are in certain 
ways similar to licenses, with the difference that the permission to 
perform an act that would otherwise infringe copyright is awarded by 
the State, and not by the owner. However, one problem discussed at 
length by copyright and licensing experts is that some licenses can be 
drafted to circumvent such exceptions.22 This therefore opens up a 
question about which law should prevail when there is such a conflict, 
contract or copyright law? This is known as the preemption problem, 
and has been the subject of considerable discussion by legal scholars23 
 17. LAWRENCE E. ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 53-57 (2004). 
 18. See id. at 58. 
 19. Id. at 57-58. 
 20. See Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright 
Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 
309 (2008). 
 21. See Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Will Shrinkwrap Suffocate Fair Use?, 23 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 237, 258-261 (Jan. 2007). 
 22. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemptions of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616, 668 
(2008). 
 23. See Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, Licensing Information in the Global 
Information Market: Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
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and the courts.24 While it is not the role of this article to expand on this 
issue, it is important to stress its relevance to the contract/license 
dichotomy. If open licenses are contracts, then it would be possible for 
them to preempt copyright exceptions under certain circumstances. 
However, most open license proponents are usually opposed to the idea 
that contract law preempts copyright law, which generates some 
practical and ideological problems to those involved, and may explain 
some of the aversion at considering these types of licenses as contracts.  
III. CONSIDERING CONSIDERATION 
The other question at the heart of this dichotomy between contracts 
and licenses rests on the issue of reciprocity, known in Common Law 
jurisdictions as consideration.25 In English Contract Law, contracts are 
perfected when there are three elements present: offer, acceptance and 
consideration.26 In a typical commercial software license, the contract 
would be perfected by the offer, which is represented by the terms and 
conditions attached to the software either in the package (known as 
shrink-wrap license), or by a message window that requires a positive 
action from the user (click-wrap license).27 The acceptance happens 
when the user opens the package (in shrink-wrap licenses), or clicks on 
the “I Agree” button (in click-wrap licenses).28 The consideration takes 
place because the software has been paid for, hence establishing some 
form of reciprocity.29  
However, open licenses present a problem to this traditional view 
of contract formation because products released under an open source 
license are often offered for free, which would mean that there is no 
consideration.30 This lack of reciprocity is vital for thinking of open 
licenses as mere grants of rights, and not as contractual obligation. 
Professor Eben Moglen comments:  
386 (1999); David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption after Bowers v. Baystate, 9 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595 (2003-04); T. Vinje, Copyright Imperilled? 21 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV 192 (1999); and Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of 
Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (1997). 
 24. Pro CD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 25. Currie v. Misa, (1875) 10 L.R. Exch. 153 (Q.B.) (defining consideration as “some 
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or 
responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the others.”). 
 26. Rosen, supra note 18, at 59. 
 27. Id. at 60. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 62. 
 30. See id. 
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A contract [. . .] is an exchange of obligations, either of promises 
for promises or of promises of future performance for present 
performance or payment. The idea that ‘licenses’ to use patents 
or copyrights must be contracts is an artifact of twentieth-
century practice, in which licensors offered an exchange of 
promises with users: ‘We will give you a copy of our 
copyrighted work,’ in essence, ‘if you pay us and promise to 
enter into certain obligations concerning the work.’ With respect 
to software, those obligations by users include promises not to 
decompile or reverse-engineer the software, and not to transfer 
the software. The GPL, however, is a true copyright license: a 
unilateral permission, in which no obligations are reciprocally 
required by the licensor. Copyright holders of computer 
programs are given, by the Copyright Act, exclusive right to 
copy, modify and redistribute their programs. The GPL, reduced 
to its essence, says: ‘You may copy, modify and redistribute this 
software, whether modified or unmodified, freely. But if you 
redistribute it, in modified or unmodified form, your permission 
extends only to distribution under the terms of this license. If 
you violate the terms of this license, all permission is 
withdrawn.31 
This seems like a valid explanation for Common Law systems, but 
in Civil Law systems contracts are perfected when the requirements of 
offer and acceptance have been met,32 which means that non-
commercial or gratuitous acts can constitute contracts under the 
appropriate conditions.33  
However, one could argue that there is consideration in some 
FOSS licenses, particularly in copyleft licenses. In short, copyleft 
clauses impose an obligation to release modifications with the same 
license with which it was received, and are present in a large number of 
open licenses, from the General Public License (GPL), to several CC 
licenses.34 Risking the over-simplification of the rich case law dealing 
with consideration and contract formation in Common Law, one could 
boil down the concept to one of reciprocity, as has been expressed 
earlier. If one defines consideration as such, then it would be possible to 
see how copyleft clauses would fulfill the requirement of consideration 
in jurisdictions where it is required. The contract then would be formed 
 31. Jones, supra note 15.  
 32. HECTOR L. MACQUEEN & JOE M. THOMSON, CONTRACT LAW IN SCOTLAND 54-56 
(2d ed. 2007). 
 33. Id. at 56-59.  
 34. See Andres Guadamuz-Gonzalez, Viral Contracts Or Unenforceable Documents? 
Contractual Validity of Copyleft Licenses, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 331 (2004) 
(discussing in detail copyleft licenses). 
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like this: making the software available under an open license would be 
the offer, using the work would be the acceptance, while consideration 
would be met by the obligation imposed in the copyleft clause. 
However, some scholars disagree that copyleft clauses meet the 
requirement of consideration.35 Giles for example, argues strongly that 
copyleft is, at best, illusory consideration, and he has found several 
cases that support his opinion.36 Particularly, he cites British Empire 
Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd,37 where the courts found 
unilateral promises that depended entirely on the will of one of the 
parties as illusory consideration. In that ruling, Judge O’Brian stated 
that: 
It is common ground that the plaintiff is obliged to supply 
nothing, and a supposed consideration which is entirely 
dependent upon the will of the plaintiff whether it will ever 
become operative is illusory.38 
However, this does not seem to be a useful analogy, as the 
promises dealt with in illusory consideration case law are very specific, 
and do not seem to translate well into the realm of open licenses. For 
example, participants in the software development community may 
have their options seriously curtailed if they use copyleft software, as 
they will be under a very real obligation to release modifications under 
the same license with which they received it. True, they may choose not 
to use the software, but is that not the case in all contracts? In other 
words, once they have accepted the terms and conditions of the license 
by using the software and modifying it, the obligation imposed on them 
seem very real and not illusory at all.39  
Furthermore, Giles seems to ignore some of the rich and deep 
criticisms to the strict application of consideration to all contracts. In an 
often quoted article, Lord Wright argues that there are several legal 
contracts that are traditionally not encumbered with the burden of 
consideration, such as firm options to be offered at a certain time.40 
Similarly, Professor Posner proposed a utilitarian test for whether 
 35. Dr. José González de Alaiza Cardona, Open Source, Free Software, and 
Contractual Issues, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 193 (Winter 2007). 
 36. Ben Giles, ‘Consideration’ and the Open Source Agreement, 49 N.S.W. SOC’Y FOR 
COMPUTERS & L.J. (2002), available at http://www.nswscl.org.au/journal/49/Giles.html. 
 37. British Empire Films Pty. Ltd. v. Oxford Theatres Pty. Ltd. (1943) V.L.R. 163 
(Austl.).  
 38.  Id. at 168.  
 39. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 10. 
 40. Lord Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the 
Common Law? 49 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1936). 
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unilateral or gratuitous promises should be enforced.41 He argued that 
some unilateral promises are not to be considered gratuitous if there is a 
condition to be met by the recipient, even if this is not pecuniary.42 For 
example, he noted that “A might promise B $100 if B would stop 
smoking. The promise here is in exchange for something (perhaps 
mysteriously) of value to A, namely B’s forbearance to smoke.”43  
Finally, Rosen seemingly solves the problem of consideration by 
suggesting that the term “copyleft” could be easily replaced by the word 
“reciprocity.”44 Talking specifically about the GPL, he believes that a 
change in terminology is warranted because both parties express a 
reciprocal set of obligations when signing up to the license.45 The 
licensor promises to allow the licensee to make use of the work, while 
the latter acquires the obligation not to release the work under other 
license, or to add new restrictions to derivative works, or to not 
distribute the work for commercial gain – as is the case with some 
Creative Commons licenses.46 These are tangible and onerous 
obligations that meet the reciprocal aspect required by Common Law 
tradition of contract formation.  
IV. CIVIL JURISDICTIONS 
As already mentioned in previous sections, licenses in general, and 
open licenses specifically, are generally classed as contracts in Civil 
Law jurisdictions, even if we accept the theory that they lack 
consideration.47 This is because Civil Law does not have consideration 
as a formal requirement for contract formation.48 In Civil Law 
traditions, contracts are perfected only with the presence of offer and 
acceptance, so pecuniary remuneration, reciprocity and the intention to 
enter into a commercial transaction do not play the important role in 
contractual doctrine and practice.49 Licenses in general are treated as 
contracts, albeit a sub-species of obligations.50 In Spanish-speaking 
countries for example, licenses are actually known formally as 
 41. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
411 (1977). 
 42. Id. at 416. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Rosen, supra note 18, at 105. 
 45. Id. at 106. 
 46. Id. at 103-104. 
 47. MacQueen, supra note 33, at 56-59. 
 48. Christian Larroumet, Detrimental Reliance and Promissory Estoppel as the Cause 
of Contracts in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (1986). 
 49. See id. 
 50. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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“contratos de licencia,” or “licencias contractuales,” literally, “license 
contracts.”51  
Even if there appears to be little debate about the legal nature of 
open licenses in Continental traditions, there are still some interesting 
questions that require further examination. For example, Argentinean 
lawyer Martín Carranza classifies open licenses, particularly the GPL, 
as a standard form contract,52 which presents some questions about the 
legal nature of the contract.53 According to Carranza, open licenses are 
typical boilerplate contracts because one of the parties drafts all the 
terms and conditions, and then the counterpart will either accept the 
contents of the document or reject them. While this seems clear with 
licenses, an interesting effect of open licenses being considered as form 
contracts is that they would be eventually subject to unfair contract 
terms legislation, which can be considerably powerful in some 
legislations.54 This would be relevant as the potentially abusive terms 
present in open licenses could be declared invalid.55 
Another point of note in Civil Jurisdictions relevant to open 
licenses is that of the distinction between unilateral and bilateral acts. 
As it has been mentioned earlier, there is a line of thought that classes 
licenses as unilateral acts56. If one was to take this view, then this type 
of legal act would fall under the regulation of unilateral obligations, 
which are generally classed as “quasi-contracts.”57 These are “purely 
voluntary acts of the party from which results any engagement 
whatsoever towards a third person, and sometimes a reciprocal 
 51. See e.g., Art. 115 of the Ley de Propiedad Intelectual  [Law of Intellectual 
Property] (B.O.E. 1996, 97), available at  http://civil.udg.es/normacivil/estatal/reals/Lpi. 
html (specifying that rights in phonograms can be granted through “licencias contractuales” 
[contractual licenses]).  
 52. Contrato de adhesión.  
 53. MARTIN CARRANZA-TORRES, PROBLEMÁTICA JURÍDICA DEL SOFTWARE LIBRE 173-
75 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 54. See e.g., Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (dealing with unfair terms in 
consumer contracts). 
 
 55. See generally Guadamuz-Gonzalez, supra note 35, at 21.  
 56. Jones, supra note 15. 
 57. Examples of laws which regulate quasi-contracts are found in most Civil Codes in 
Continental traditions.  See e.g., Code Civil [C. CIV.] [Civil Code] art. 1371 et seq. (Fr.), 
available as translated at  http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=22&r=493; 
Codigo Civil [Civil Code] art. 1887 et seq. (Spain), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com 
/base_datos/Privado/cc.l4t16.html; Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 42, § 812, available as translated at  http://www.gesetze 
-im-internet.de/ englisch_bgb/ german_civil_code.pdf; see also H. G. BEALE, & DENIS 
TALLON, CONTRACT LAW 77-79 (Hart Pub. 2002). 
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engagement of two parties.”58 Similarly, the recent Principles of 
European Private Law,59 which contain a series of model rules for 
harmonizing European contract law, also provide contractual 
enforceability to unilateral acts, which are classified as “juridical 
acts.”60 § I:101(2) defines juridical acts thus:  
A juridical act is any statement or agreement, whether express or 
implied from conduct, which is intended to have legal effect as 
such. It may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.61 
The importance of the inclusion of open licenses as either quasi-
contracts or juridical acts is that these tend to have the same effects as 
contracts. For example, § I:103(2) of the Principles of European Private 
Law considers that a unilateral act is “binding on the person giving it if 
it is intended to be legally binding without acceptance.”62 While there is 
a good argument to be made against the idea that open licenses are 
bilateral in nature, the argument is moot in Civil Law systems because 
licenses would be covered under general norms of contract law even if 
they are unilateral obligations.   
V. RECENT CASE LAW 
Regardless of these seemingly theoretical discussions, the 
contract/license dichotomy has been discussed at length in a recent case 
Jacobsen v. Katzer,63 which dealt precisely with this question.   
The case involved Robert Jacobsen, an open source developer 
participating in an open source64 project called Java Model Railroad 
Interface (JMRI), which is a model train software released under the 
Artistic License.65 Jacobsen received a letter demanding license fee 
payments from a company named Kamind Associates, owned by 
Matthew Katzer, which had previously obtained software patents66 over 
 58. C. CIV. art. 1371 (Fr.). 
 59. CHRISTIAN VON BAR, PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW 183 (Sellier 2008). 
 60. Id. at 105. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 183. 
 63. Jacobsen v. Katzner, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), vacated, Jacobson v. Katzer,  
No. C 06-01905 JSW 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63568 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007). 
 64. See Open Source Initiative (OSI), The Artistic License, http://www.opensource.or 
g/licenses/artistic-license-1.0.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2009). 
 65. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376. 
 66. Model Train Control System, U.S. Patent No. 7,216,836 (filed Oct. 26, 2004) 
(issued May 15, 2007). 
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model rail road software.67 Jacobsen decided to pre-empt legal action 
and sued Katzer first, alleging that the patent was invalid on the grounds 
of obviousness, and for failure to meet disclosure requirements68. He 
later amended the complaint to include copyright infringement, as he 
claimed that his software pre-dated Katzer’s69. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California 
ruled on a motion to dismiss by the defendants and on a motion for 
preliminary injunction from the plaintiff70. The District Court granted 
some of the motions to dismiss, denied others, and denied the claim for 
preliminary injunction71. The important part of the decision for the 
current discussion is the analysis of the copyright infringement claims. 
The District Court declared that because the software was released to 
the public online through an open source license, there was clear 
permission to use the software72. The Artistic License is not a copyleft 
license, it allows modification and the creation of derivatives, provided 
that those doing it insert prominent notices on each file, and perform 
one of the following: 
a) place your modifications in the Public Domain or otherwise 
make them Freely Available, such as by posting said 
modifications to Usenet or an equivalent medium, or placing the 
modifications on a major archive site such as ftp.uu.net, or by 
allowing the Copyright Holder to include your modifications in 
the Standard Version of the Package. 
b) use the modified Package only within your corporation or 
organization. 
c) rename any non-standard executables so the names do not 
conflict with standard executables, which must also be provided, 
and provide a separate manual page for each non-standard 
executable that clearly documents how it differs from the 
Standard Version. 
d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright 
Holder.73 
The District Court astutely understood that such restrictions are not 
copyright restrictions, they are contractual obligations.74 They claimed: 
 67. Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63568, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007). 
 68. Id. at *2-*3. 
 69. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376. 
 70. Jacobsen, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63568, at *1. 
 71. Id. at *2. 
 72. Id. at *17-*18. 
 73. Open Source Initiative, supra note 65, at § 3.  
 74. Jacobsen, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63568, at *18. 
Guadamuz (3-18) 3/18/2009  3:56 PM 
2009] DICHOTOMY IN OPEN LICENSES 113 
 
Based on the both the allegations in the amended complaint and 
the explicit language of the JMRI Project’s artistic license, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff has chosen to distribute his decoder 
definition files by granting the public a nonexclusive license to 
use, distribute and copy the files. The nonexclusive license is 
subject to various conditions, including the licensee’s proper 
attribution of the source of the subject files. However, implicit in 
a nonexclusive license is the promise not to sue for copyright 
infringement. [. . .] Therefore, under this reasoning, Plaintiff 
may have a claim against Defendants for breach[ing] the 
nonexclusive license agreement, but perhaps not a claim 
sounding in copyright. [. . .] However, merely finding that 
there was a license to use does not automatically preclude a 
claim for copyright infringement. [. . .] The condition that the 
user insert a prominent notice of attribution does not limit the 
scope of the license. Rather, Defendants’ alleged violation of the 
conditions of the license may have constituted a breach of the 
nonexclusive license, but does not create liability for copyright 
infringement where it would not otherwise exist. (Emphasis 
added)75 
The District Court alleged that there should be no presumption of a 
copyright infringement claim, and that such claim should be proven 
before the plaintiff can make its case.76 If the plaintiff cannot provide 
evidence that such a claim may be successful in court, then Jacobson 
could only rely on the contractual elements of the license in order to 
seek redress; namely, the failure to place attribution notices is not 
enough to make a copyright claim, but a contractual one.77 Interestingly, 
the District Court understood perfectly the trade-off in open source 
licenses that rests at the very heart of the contract/license dichotomy: if 
the user complies with the license, there is permission to use the 
software, and therefore there is no copyright infringement. But, if there 
is no claim for copyright over the work, then the only claim possible is 
through breach of contract. 
Katzer appealed the District Court ruling, and it made its way to 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which repealed 
the decision by holding that open source licenses set out permissions to 
use the work, and if the license disappears, then the user would be 
infringing copyright.78 The ruling makes for some interesting reading, 
and the CAFC says that: 
 75. Id. at *19-*20.. 
 76. Id. at *20. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381. 
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In this case, a user who downloads the JMRI copyrighted 
materials is authorized to make modifications and to distribute 
the materials provided that the user follows the restrictive terms 
of the Artistic License. A copyright holder can grant the right to 
make certain modifications, yet retain his right to prevent other 
modifications. Indeed, such a goal is exactly the purpose of 
adding conditions to a license grant. The Artistic License, like 
many other common copyright licenses, requires that any copies 
that are distributed contain the copyright notices and the 
COPYING file.79 
The CAFC has to be congratulated for understanding the basic 
concepts behind open source licensing. In various passages, they clearly 
“get” the basis of the movement and the underlying rights. The CAFC 
has delivered the highest instance recognition to open licenses, which is 
another encouraging sign for FOSS development. The appeal has also 
pleased many in the FOSS community. For example, the ruling closely 
follows the arguments presented in an amicus curiae against the District 
Court interpretation. In it, the Open Source Initiative, the Linux 
Foundation, and others, argued that “it would be enormously beneficial 
to public licensing for this Court to state clearly a rule regarding the 
importance of interpreting public licenses in a manner consistent with 
their unique nature and federal copyright policy.”80 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the final decision in Katzer, I still think that it is preferable 
to classify FOSS licenses as contracts. If this is the case, one has to 
wonder about why the FSF is so adamant in their insistence that their 
licenses, in particular the GPL, are not contracts. There are few practical 
reasons why some FOSS proponents insist on licenses not having 
contractual strength. Moglen is on record stating that the GPL primarily 
rests on copyright and the international protection awarded by the Berne 
Convention.81 He is also uneasy with the global variability of contract 
law, and is afraid that a judge in one jurisdiction may impose local 
contract law interpretations which may affect the project globally.82 By 
 79. Id. at 1382. 
 80. Brief of Amici Curiae Creative Commons Corp. et al. In Support of Plaintiff–
Appellant, Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1001), 2007 WL 
4968765.  
 81.  Jones, supra note 15. 
 82. The Auskadi Blog Place, Interview Eben Moglen, Legal Counsel, Free Software 
Foundation, Mar. 3, 2004, http://auskadi.civiblog.org/blog/_archives/2005/6/25/972325.ht 
ml (last visited March 6, 2009) (transcribing an interview of Eben Moglen by Kathy 
Bowrey). 
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using copyright instead of contract, it is in the licensee’s best interest to 
make sure that the license is valid, as they would otherwise be 
infringing copyright without the document that permits them to make 
use of the work. He says:  
So all that I do is bring an infringement action. It is the 
defendant’s responsibility to prove license and the only credible 
license for the defendant to plead is my license, because code is 
not otherwise available except under that license.83 
This seems to be a rather negative view of copyright licensing, as 
it seems like all use of the licensed work should be considered a priori 
infringement until proven otherwise. Using the earlier analogy about 
licensing, this would be the same as if I were to invite a friend to my 
house, and the moment they enter I would call the police claiming 
trespass. It is more logical to think of the invitation itself as a license 
that allows my friend to perform an action which they would not 
otherwise have a right to do, namely enter my house without 
permission. Were they to behave in a manner contrary to the terms of 
the invitation, I would be justified in asking them to leave, and call the 
police if they refuse to do so. Moglen seems to think of copyright 
licenses as expressing the first scenario and not the second, which 
seems detrimental to licensees worldwide. Furthermore, as discussed 
above in Jacobsen v. Katzer, there is a real possibility that the user will 
not have a claim in copyright, and therefore all of the obligations 
contained in the license can only be enforced through contract.  
The above analysis makes an important point if one considers the 
practicalities in software development in particular. Code is created, 
copied, transferred and modified by people all over the world. It is 
possible to imagine a situation where code has reached a developer in 
such a modified state that the original owner will no longer be able to 
claim copyright over it. English courts have considered the minimal 
amount of code that would be infringing by following the general 
qualitative test in cases of copying from another work. In both 
Richardson Computers v Flanders84 and Ibcos v Barclays,85 the courts 
found that if there had been any copying from a protected original work, 
that there had to be an analysis of whether such copying had been 
substantial. There will be some consideration about the quantity of the 
work copied, but even if this is minimal it may result that the copying 
 83. Id.   
 84. John Richardson Computers, Ltd. v. Flanders, (1993) F.S.R. 497 (Ch.) (U.K.).    
 85. IBCOS Computers Ltd. v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd., (1994) 
F.S.R. 275 (Ch.) (U.K.).  
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may be deemed to be substantial. This is evident in the case of Cantor v 
Tradition,86 where copying of original source code took place from 
former employees of a financial services company. In this case, expert 
witnesses found that only 2% of the original source code had been 
copied, accounting for only 2,952 lines of code out 77,000.87 The lines 
of code were deemed to be of importance for some modules in the 
resulting software, but the copying was not considered substantial to 
grant the infringement case, but was enough for the copier to agree to 
take financial responsibility for the infringed code and offer to pay for 
it.88 One could therefore imagine a situation where such a change has 
taken place, and enough changes have occurred so that the code would 
no longer be subject to copyright.  
To conclude, the question of the legal nature of open licenses is 
more certain in Civil Law jurisdictions than it is in Common Law. 
While there is no problem of there being a jurisdictional split in this 
area, those people who use works released with an open license should 
be mindful of some of the jurisdictional pitfalls highlighted above. 
Authors and creators who wish to release their works under one of these 
licenses, and are thinking about enforcement of their rights, may have to 
consider that their best claims may lie in contract and not copyright law. 
Copyright owners in Civil Law jurisdictions should also be prepared to 
face the fact that enforcement of their works in Common Law systems 
may not be contractual, but it may be subject to copyright. Given the 
reputation of draconian copyright enforcement in the United States, this 
may give those same authors cause for concern.  
 
 86. Cantor Fitzgerald International v. Tradition (U.K.) Ltd., (2000) R.P.C. 95 (Ch.) 
(U.K.). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
